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Phenomenology, Theology and Psychosis: 
Towards Compassion 
My aim in this article is to initiate reflection upon psychosis by way of 
phenomenology and theology.  From the basis of phenomenology and theology, I wish 
to present a new perspective that may help to understand the nature and experience of 
psychosis.  My approach will be especially, but not wholly, influenced by the 
philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (1905-1995), whose writings in recent times have 
been of great interest for Christian theologians.1 Particularly, I have set out to develop 
several ideas of his earlier work, Existence and Existents, and of his latter work, 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence.2  Accordingly, whilst there will be 
similarities between my writing and Levinas’, there will also be a necessary departure 
as my own thought becomes evident.  But, for the purpose of clarity, let us look briefly 
at Levinas’ post-phenomenology and its possible connection to the study of mental 
health. 
 
Levinas’ development of metaphysics beyond the thought of Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger and Franz Rosenzweig has proved to be of special interest, especially in the 
domains of ethics and theology.3 But I believe this can be extended to mental health. 
After all, Levinas’ thought goes beyond the intentionalilty of consciousness to a non-
intentionality, that is, to a pre-reflective consciousness.  Hence, the act of 
consciousness must not be objectified within reality and existence.  He will thus focus 
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upon two extremes: (i) an anonymous and depersonalised consciousness (in his earlier 
works)4 and (ii) a passive consciousness that takes a variety of forms: fearing for the 
Other; a moral conscience; and as ethical transcendence (especially in his latter 
works).5   
 
In a later writing, he will indicate that there will be times where a ‘possible confusion’ 
might exist between the two, namely between alterity (ethical responsibility for the 
Other) and a depersonalised existence (the ‘stirring of the there is [il y a]’).6  But the 
idea here is to evoke both a sense of comedy and tragedy.  On the one hand, the point 
is this: behind the present comic dimension where the moral self puts his or her 
conscience into question is the absent (in the sense of being absent from 
consciousness) tragic dimension that shocks the human soul and inverts it from self-
interest to disinterestedness (alterity/otherness). As a result, the subject is frightened 
out of its spectatorial attitude, producing a course of action in union with the Absolute 
Good. Such responsibility is not the product of theoretical consciousness, but is due to 
an extreme passivity of responsibility.  On the other hand, the confusion also indicates 
the overwhelming presence of a depersonalised existence.  Here, there is no logical 
thought: the depersonalised existence is confused as an absence of evil and hence, as 
an illusion of the good.  And it is this last point from which I want to begin my 
description and analysis of psychosis. 
 
My aim is to pierce open the experience of psychosis. I will speak of death, horror, the 
emotions, existence and reality (qualities of Being), states of altered existence and of 
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grief, persecution, humiliation, exposure, mercy and compassion.  My focus will 
appear very phenomenological, but as the article progresses, I will introduce some 
theology to emphasise the face of the suffering Other is the place and time of the 
encounter with the word of God.  But firstly, we will approach psychosis as an 
existence cut off from reality.  In such horror, fear is the dominant emotion and 
becomes so suffocating that it takes the form of an idol. As a result, the self is turned 
inside out by being removed of subjectivity.  It exists in an anonymous vigilance 
towards the idol or ‘thing’.7  In this regard, death seems impossible.  Furthermore, in 
the everyday world delusions and fears take on the role of hiding the possibility of 
death.  In a sense, the self exists as a trace of a (effaced) past, that is, a past devoid of 
hope and life.  
 
Following on from our analysis of existence and reality, we will look at three states of 
altered existence, namely, idolisation, ethical escapism, and terrifying and enthralling 
transcendence.  John Caruana, in his analysis of ‘Lévinas’ Critique of the Sacred’, has 
pointed to these ‘states of mind’.8  While his aim is more to explain, prove and bring 
out Levinas’ understanding of the sacred, I will try to show that the world of psychosis 
is one that parallels the Levinasian criticisms of the language of ontology and its 
associated categories of objectivity, presence and Being. We do not merely want to 
use ontology to describe psychosis.  Rather, the argument is this: the character of the 
language of ontology itself holds insights into the experience of psychosis. 
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Levinas has challenged both the quest for the meaning of Being and the primacy of lived 
experience.  This is to say that his philosophy puts into question the attempt to use 
ontological language with the categories of objectivity, presence and Being.  However, 
the very way in which he speaks of the contamination of ontology particularly in 
theology signifies that ontological language itself can offer some insight into psychosis.  
For Levinas, the idea of ‘Being’ contaminates the mystery of God.9   The experience of 
Being is perhaps a catastrophe for the encounter of God.  It is a catastrophe because 
Being’s truth reflects more a servitude to self-interest rather than the quality of God ‘as 
such’. Even though Levinasian thought advocates a language of otherness, his criticisms 
of ontology should not be neglected as they contain starting points in themselves for 
reflection. 
 
Levinas’ thought directs our attention to the person and in particular to the face rather 
than ontological theories and problems.  This suggests that the language of alterity 
(otherness) could also be very useful to understand psychosis.  However, we should not 
understand such a language as an answer or a cure for psychosis, but more as a response 
that can bring about a space and a time for compassion, understanding and having a heart.  
In a Levinasian sense, alterity or otherness identifies the personal encounter with the 
Other rather than one’s own personal experience and objectivity as what truly defines 
consciousness.  As a result, the self is obliged to sacrifice for the Other to the point of 
expiation. 
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In order to appreciate and utilise Levinas’ thought, we cannot ignore what he means when 
speaking of responsibility for the Other beyond the categories of objectivity, presence and 
Being.  Let us look briefly at Levinas’ conception of these categories.  Levinas defines 
objectivity as ‘Being’s essence [the event of Being] revealed in truth’.10  In short, 
objectivity is knowledge11 without being the fruit of any relational personhood. 
Accordingly, as Being is tied to an egoistical, all-knowing and all-consuming 
consciousness, let us call this the totality of objectivity. Levinas argues that such 
objectivity in consciousness distorts truth.12  The distortion occurs when consciousness is 
reduced to a totalising presence - perhaps like an ideological or utopian economic model 
for society that obscures the event of God’s self-communication to us.  As a result, the 
objectivity (totality) of Being absorbs, encloses and depersonalises the subject’s dreams, 
hopes and even desire to serve the neighbour.13  In a sense, the reality of knowledge, 
whether it is imagined, delusional or even logical, is so overwhelming and commanding 
that it suppresses an other-centred existence. This suggests that subjectivity, the 
personhood of relating with others, is subordinated to objective propositions of 
experience which we find in egoisms struggling with others in the search for 
intelligibility.14  This gives subjectivity a transcendental status rather than a substantive 
one; subjectivity is subordinated to totality of the event of Being/care for oneself.  
Furthermore, such totality results in a dark presence, ‘the fact-of-Being’, in which the ego 
reduces its subjectivity with others to its own cold world of judgments, experiences and 
representations.15  In this context, presence is that which encompasses, absorbs and 
encloses things and consciousness.16  It is not surprising that Levinas can speak of this as 
‘the horror of the night’.17 
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We can note that the categories of objectivity, presence and Being play an integral part in 
the language of ontology. Objectivity can indicate the dominating power of deluding 
knowledge.  Presence draws upon such knowledge to the illusion of determining the 
meaning of Being or one’s reality in the world.  This seems to suggest the light of Being 
is in fact a dark horror in which fear and anxiety are the dominant emotions.  Ontology 
gives us no way out of delusions and the horror that grips a contaminated and 
catastrophic reality. But the character of the language nevertheless serves to parallel the 
three states of existence, idolisation, ethical escapism, and terrifying and enthralling 
transcendence.  After considering these states, we will come to the final task of 
suggesting that the poor one in our midst should not just be objectified as ‘psychotic’.  
For example, to merely give objective interpretations that he or she is “schizophrenic’ 
will not help.  But we want to argue that the face rather than the interpretation is the locus 
for a compassionate encounter, above all an encounter in which the word of God might 
be heard.  Accordingly, I will suggest a radical, compassionate and expiating way of 
responding to the fears, outrage and pain of the suffering Other.  But let us first begin 
with a look at existence and reality as a means to first pierce open the experience of 
psychosis. 
 
EXISTENCE AND REALITY 
In the world of communication, we are often taken over by language.  We use discourse 
and reason to make sense of the world.  We desire to discover truth whilst indeed trying 
to escape from it.  We search to understand reality through language, meaning and 
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reason.  However, there are times when a word of reason is too present and too 
overwhelming.  This is because we can never totally conceive the meaning of our own 
existence and reality; we remain at most a partial and momentary presence to ourselves.  
In our attempts to search for meaning and truth, our articulations may become distorted, 
unreal and imaginary.  None the less, whether or not language or thinking is insightful or 
illusionary, it is a way in which we express our consciousness and its associated 
emotions. 
 
In our search for reason, language might also become impersonal and objectified.  As a 
result, it takes a destructive and depersonalising turn to the extent of becoming lost in a 
cold horror of objectivity. We often might touch upon this experience when the horror of 
life is so much that we dare not enter into our own selves.  There is something in us that 
leads to fear of being personal or subjective.  This fear is an anonymous and 
depersonalising presence of objective reality, knowledge and reason.  Such fear or 
presence is anonymous because it is too horrible.  It is also depersonalising in so far as it 
destroys subjectivity and the ability to relate with others.  Hence, it is not surprising that 
the self, fearful of the world, might become lost in darkness and chaos.  This is a presence 
dividing the self from reason, and truth from human becoming and relational personhood. 
 
For the most part, the objective world is a partial presence in consciousness; there is so 
much that we do not know about.  Such unknowing produces fear.  In other words, the 
world is not only present by way of knowledge, ideas and imagination, but also through 
fear.  We know that the self is both in relation to itself and the world.  Yet, the extent to 
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which the relation is governed by being conscious ‘of something’ is the extent to which 
the self remains caught in its own possibilities and fears (the Heideggerian care for 
Being).  This suggests four points.  First, every act of consciousness is a search for the 
presence of meaning. Second, every act of consciousness is also a relation and response 
to Being, that is, the presence of things in the world (real or imaginary). Third, the act of 
consciousness signifies the fears of nothingness and anxiety.  Fourth, granted the self is 
usually centred on its own possibilities, fears and desires, the act of consciousness 
grounds experience as objective in the sense of making it ‘mine’.  We can begin to see a 
pattern in which the conscious self responds to the presence of other things in the world 
by objectifying them in a possessive and egoistic way.  Accordingly, it seems that the self 
is caught up in an ontological world of knowledge, relation, fear and egoism. 
 
The meaning of things in the world is caught up in a world of experience, knowledge and 
fear.  It may seem that the self is caught in a chaotic whirlwind in which there is a hunger 
to search for truth.  But in this hunger, the self is often swayed by the temptation not to 
uncover the hidden truth of things.  There are constant temptations not to think and to 
hide behind the relative opinions and values of society as a whole.  We fear a menacing 
presence in the world: something unknown, awake and asleep, that disturbs, seeks us out 
and aims at us.18  We might experience this as fear in the form of anxiety and uncertainty.  
If the fear is too consuming, existence becomes shattered; we lose a sense of our personal 
self.  We are left with a consuming darkness that leaves the self unable to engage 
normally with others. 
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When fear becomes so overwhelming, we face a ‘horror of the night’: an inability to 
ascertain the presence or absence of anything.  In this horrible eternity, there is darkness 
in and around the self that calls into question any attempt to derive meaning and truth.  
The darkness creates illusion.  In such an existential state of being cut off from itself, the 
self undergoes a threefold altered state of existence: (i) idolisation, (ii) ethical escapism, 
and (iii) terrifying and enthralling transcendence.  Let us look at these states of altered 
existence. 
 
IDOLISATION 
Idolisation is an illusional state that results in the depersonalisation of the self.  The idol 
in this case is the self’s experience: all its ideas, thoughts, imagination and fears. In this 
state of being separated from reality (truth, meaning and relationship), a suffocating type 
of existence takes hold.  It is suffocating because any resemblance of reality ‘as such’ (as 
it truly is) is rejected and blocked.  In fact, existence is so suffocating that the idol (the 
experience itself) shreds the self of any value.  No amount of suffering and 
haemorrhaging of wounds will rupture the state of such depersonalising existence. The 
self’s experience of suffering bleeds fear to such a degree that the self becomes lost, 
numb and divided from reality.  Furthermore, the fears (delusions and illusions) 
depersonalise the self to such a degree that the self takes an anonymous form; it becomes 
‘a nothing’ in the horror of existence.  What is left is the idol, the cold and heartless 
experience of fear itself. 
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In the darkness of existence, the self is both idol and fear. Accordingly, all ideas, thoughts 
and imagination must partake in fear and idolisation; they are like servants of the idol-
experience.  Here, there is no role of the self.  In fact, the self is but a trace to itself, lost 
in darkness.  Nevertheless, the idol commands a response, an overshadowing experience 
that must always negate the self: its fusion with the idol.  This response cannot be heard, 
or seen or sensed in any way.  Taking a non-personal form, we discover traces of the 
response in delusions and illusions pouring into reality. These traces of horror seek to 
evade ethical responsibility.  The idol, having reduced the self to anonymity and anxiety, 
can now aim at the good, seek it out and corrupt it with the heart of evil.  Taking on a 
closed and suffocating existence, idolisation is the first movement and experience of 
delusion.  Once it is formed like a haunting ghost in consciousness, the self is now tied to 
modify the good to its delusional state of fear and horror. 
 
ETHICAL ESCAPISM 
I have tried to suggest that experience by itself is so embracing that it suffocates the 
reality of the self.  Accordingly, the self loses control of its ideas, thoughts and the 
imagination to the idol.  The idol emerges as a trace in reality as it seeks to give itself 
meaning and significance by seeking out the good.  But its attachment to the good is 
destructive.  Moving through fear and anxiety, the idol or ‘thing’ expresses itself in 
relation to the good because it must hide its difference from it.  Furthermore, by seeking 
to relate to what is good, the-self-as-idol confuses itself with the good, and thus has found 
a way paradoxically to escape the ethical life.  This is because the idol dwells in the 
totality of Being; it can never embrace a life of transcendence as it cannot divest itself of 
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the anonymous and depersonalising nature of Being and pass over beyond towards ethical 
subjectivity. 
 
The self, consumed by the idol, not only sets out to escape the good. It also seeks to strike 
at reality with its totalising presence.  This is to say, for example, that delusional thoughts 
and behaviours are naturally attracted to the good.  But not being able to subjectively 
approach the good, the idol objectifies it as an experience.  The experience is so all-
consuming and overwhelming that it leaves no room for the good.  As a result, believing 
itself to be in the realm of the good, the idol reduces the good to its presence of fear and 
delusions.  We can name this a state of ethical escapism because whilst the idol seeks to 
merge with the good, its escapes from it by way of its hidden intent to negate (reduce) the 
good to experience, namely its experience and existence of fear, horror and alienation.  
Such experience necessarily finds its expression through language, behaviour and even in 
the realm of transcendence. 
 
TRANSCENDENCE 
The idol that has consumed the self with fear, aimed at the good to remove itself from it, 
is now ready to participate in the sacred.  The experience of the sacred, as Caruana has 
pointed out, can be both terrifying and enthralling.19  Yet, it is surprising that he did not 
introduce the idea of death in his analysis, a theme so prevalent in Levinas’ writings.20  
Moving beyond Caruana’s analysis of the sacred, we can suggest that by approaching the 
sacred, the anonymous ‘thing’ (or the idol of presence and fear) seeks an enthralling and 
terrifying experience above all experiences, namely the impossibility of death.  This is the 
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final consummation for the idol to strip subjectivity inside out.  In the guise of emotional 
and mystical experience, the idol is both fear and horror. In other words, the act of 
participating in such a false sense of sacred transcendence – such as experiencing awe, 
enthusiasm, mystery, rapture and mystical ecstasy – is an illusional state that results in 
the depersonalisation of the self.21  But in saying this, I do not wish to deny a true sense 
of transcendence that might also bear the effects of awe, enthusiasm, mystery, rapture and 
mystical ecstasy.  Given such personal encounters of the divine that animate the mind, 
heart, soul and body through prayer, liturgy or having a heart for the other, I would regard 
these encounters as signs of transcendence, or let us say, sacred feelings, that lead us 
beyond the everyday experience of our senses towards peace, mercy and justice.  
Nevertheless, to distinguish between false and true transcendence is daunting, as the word 
of God penetrates our existence and reality into realms beyond knowledge, experience 
and presence.  Perhaps, by way of exploring the very idea of death, we might discern 
whether a feeling of awe, for example, is an idol experience or the very word of God. 
 
For the idol, nothing is more enthralling and more terrifying than the impossibility of 
death.  This is because death is the greatest fear that ends all fears.  Death is made 
impossible because the idol must negate its reality and mystery.  In other words, the idol 
must divide the ‘experience of death’ from death itself.  Granted that the idol denies the 
event of death to the self, the self nevertheless experiences a death turned inside out, 
namely a terrible horror of being abandoned to a solitude without end; a shadowy life of 
anonymous personhood.  In this sense, we can suggest that the idol is also the self turned 
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inside out.  Its relation to the self is one that denies the possibility for the self to die and 
thus to be in a world of well-being. 
 
We now come to realise that by seeking a terrifying state of transcendence, the idol can 
more powerfully divide itself from the true self and allow its being to approach the world 
with the language of fear and horror.  Having no face – as the ghostly self is anonymous – 
there is the impossibility of death.  Whilst the self is depersonalised, the idol is free to 
transforms ideas, emotions and the imagination into behaviours of fear and horror that 
ultimately might become also enthralling. 
 
The three states of altered existence emphasise that the self is vulnerable to experience in 
everyday life.  Any experience could overwhelm the self with trauma.  We have desires 
in life in which we seek to gain importance, make them good and even treat them as 
sacred.  But there are times when consciousness cannot always deal with experiences and 
emotions.  They can become exaggerated, an unwelcome excess or even an ache of woe.   
Accordingly, such traumas can consume the reality of the self, turn it inside out and 
throw it into an impersonal vigilance of fear and horror. To maintain such a state, the idol 
of fear must not only deceive the good, but transcend the possibility of death and thus 
ever deny its reality and mystery to the self.  In effect, the idol prevents the self from 
engaging in meaning, insight and personhood. 
 
RESPONDING TO FEAR AND DEATH: TOWARDS COMPASSION 
 14 
I have suggested that when the self is locked in servitude to its idol-experience, it is 
surrounded by fear and is denied the possibility of death. Just as the overwhelming 
experiences of the self have denied the self of personhood, so we need something of 
equal or even greater force that can allow the sense of self to be renewed.  So far, I have 
set out to describe how an all-consuming presence of experience turns the self inside out 
leaving only the sheer anonymity of existence.  In this eternal darkness, everything seems 
lost and forsaken.  A nocturnal vigilance takes hold in which the self allows its 
(ontological) lostness to ever deepen its fears.  A new ‘thing’, namely the idol takes the 
place of the self and commands traces of the self to evolve its imagination, reason and 
consciousness into fear. 
 
Seeking the good, the idol will never allow the self to be touched by well-being and truth.  
As a result, delusions of reality create space and time for the good to be aimed at and 
contaminated.  But the powerful presence of the idol (experience and fear) will 
nevertheless forsake the good as it must search for a terrifying and enthralling 
transcendence.  The idol must convince the self that death is impossible. Only then might 
it have a chance in Being to outlast the good.  Towards this delusion, the idol-in-the-self 
must show that the self has been divested of its personhood, leaving only traces.  More 
deeply, delusions and illusions of reality must continue so that experience might be truly 
divided from everyday reality and a nurturing existence. 
 
If at best we can only respond to traces of the self and moreover traces that continue to 
efface the memory of the self, how then are we to respond?  The idol, by its very 
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depersonalising nature, seeks to make the self faceless, beyond memory and eternally 
fearful.  I suggest that an ethical response is to allow for a graced space and time for the 
face to emerge.  We need to allow ourselves not only to be faced by the fear and misery 
of a poor one, but to be there for them in their loneliness, outrage and fear of the 
experience of death. The idea of the face of the Other signifies exposure and evokes the 
biblical themes of the love of neighbour and being made in the image of God.22 
 
In the epiphany of the face of the Other, Levinas discerns three aspects, namely, 
destitution, facing and demand.  He brings them together in the following condensed 
statement: 
 
The first thing which is evident in the face of the other is this rectitude of exposure and 
defenselessness.  In his face, the human being is most naked, destitution itself.  And at 
the same time, he faces.  It is a manner in which he is completely alone in his facing us 
that we measure the violence perpetrated in death.  Third moment of the epiphany of 
the face: it makes a demand on me.  The face looks at me and calls me.  It lays claim 
to me. 23 
 
The first aspect of the moment of the face is the poverty of the Other.  The face reveals 
the nakedness and neediness of the human being.  But paradoxically, the face is also non-
phenomenal.  This is strange because it is the naked phenomenon.  To understand this 
ambiguity, Levinas points out in the second moment that from within the face is the 
command to be responsible, which can never be represented in consciousness.  This 
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suggests that the self encounters a messianic and immemorial dimension of time in which 
the Other’s destitution is exposed. In a third aspect of the epiphany of the face, the self is 
confronted with a demand to be responsible to and for this Other, in a particularity that 
transcends the abstractions of Being and the more routine experience of the Other.  These 
three aspects of the face of the Other define a sense of love for our neighbour, with the 
fear for the Other’s death and solitude. 
 
Looking at Levinas’ analysis, the face of one overwhelmed by the suffocating embrace of 
presence (such as fear and anxiety turning meaning and truth into a catastrophe) seems to 
me like a trace of a past.  It is like a past because it has never been present to everyday 
consciousness.  As a trace, the face resists the presence of our judgments, experience and 
critical analysis.  Moreover, as trace of a past, the face signifies an ethical relation beyond 
the categories of knowledge, experience and presence.  We might encounter the face of 
the suffering others where there is hope, that is a moment in which we can give room for 
ourselves to be exposed to their fear and suffering.  If obligation and responsibility 
arouses inside of us, there is the possibility that we might have heard the word of God.  
The face (perhaps the very word of God) is a trace of hunger for reality and a thirst for 
life.  Accordingly it must accuse, even traumatise and command us into responsibility. It 
accuses us because we have been too late to listen to their cries and haemorrhaging of 
life.  It traumatises because we have never heard their cry.  Finally, the face commands us 
from an immemorial past of peace and mercy.  In this regard, the face is the very space 
and time for which the word of God to come to mind.  The face demands a difficult 
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freedom and a future world: a liturgy of responsibility in which no eye has seen nor ear 
heard nor heart conceived (Isa. 64:4; 1 Cor 2:9). 
 
We can begin to appreciate that the face of the poor one awakes within us, like a great 
and terrible wind, graces of exposure and maternity (mercy). The Levinasian idea of 
‘exposure’ depicts a state of consciousness deeply affected by the Other’s wounds, 
outrage and insult.  In this sense, it implies a hyperbolic passivity or vulnerability to the 
Other.  As Levinas explains it, ‘Here exposure has a sense radically different from 
thematisation.  The one is exposed to the other as a skin is exposed to what wounds it as a 
cheek is offered to the smiter’.24  Such exposure is the cause and result of an acute 
responsibility.  Levinas graphically describes it as a haemorrhaging for the Other.25  
Ethical consciousness bleeds for the suffering Other.  This kind of exposure also has 
erotic overtones.  Though Levinas disassociates love from eros,26 he nonetheless employs 
a number of erotic ideas and images in his elaboration of the meaning of ‘exposure’.  
‘Maternity’ is one such example.  Here we read, ‘Maternity, which is bearing par 
excellence, bears even responsibility for the persecuting by the persecutor’.27  Levinas’ 
ethically modulated idea of exposure to the Other is not above using a wide range of 
physical, erotic and affected-laden images. 
 
Levinas makes a linguistic and theological connection of his notion of ‘maternity’ to the 
Hebrew terms mercy (Rakhamim) and uterus (Rekhem) respectively.  He recognises that 
Rekhem is the origin of the word Rakhamim.  It is therefore not surprising, then, that he 
goes on to suggest, ‘Rakhamim is the relation of the uterus to the other, whose gestation 
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takes place within it. Rakhamim is maternity itself.  God as merciful is God defined by 
maternity.’28  Here we can detect a Talmudic influence on Levinas’ philosophical 
discourse.  He brings together the ideas and images of mercy and maternity, but 
paradoxically in a context that stresses love as distinct from eros.  He clarifies this by 
observing that, ‘For the encounter with the face I still reserve another word: miséricorde, 
mercy, when one assumes responsibility for the suffering of the other.  This appears 
naturally as the phenomenon of love.’29  The encounter with the Other remains 
throughout a painful and difficult condition.  When love is related to such all-exacting 
alterity, there is little room for imaging love as an experience of erotic joy. 
 
Both the terms, exposure and maternity, signify the extreme alterity of a life of genuine 
otherness.  When eros is made to surrender so completely to ethical intersubjectivity, an 
outer limit of self-renunciation is presumed: the personal experiences of joy, desire and 
personal taste or disposition cannot be primary in the face of the gravity of the suffering, 
hunger and loneliness of the Other.30  Such an exposure to the Other’s destitution and the 
necessity of bearing of the Other’s faults results in a divine comedy, a grave drama 
whereby, ‘… the laughter sticks to one’s throat when the neighbour approaches – that is, 
when his face, or his forsakenness, draws near’.31  In this ironic role-reversing plot of 
ethical existence, God’s transcendence is shown forth in the self’s responsibility for the 
Other.  The ethical self can no longer refer to God through objectivity, presence and 
Being, but through the self’s passivity towards the Other.32 We will now try to take our 
understanding of the graces of exposure and maternity (mercy) a step further. 
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Beyond the possibility of treating this Other as an experience or a theoretical idea, we are 
exposed to them and, moreover, to their faces.  Through exposure, our ethical 
consciousness maternally bleeds for the suffering Other; we become deeply affected by 
his/her wounds, outrage and insult.  What is actually taking place is first not an activity of 
responsibility, but one of acute passivity and mercy.  The uncaring ego in ourselves 
begins to contract in which our sense of the Other moves from one of pity or even 
heartlessness to compassion, having a heart and even friendship.  A certain fusion occurs 
between myself and the suffering reality of the Other.  In this new identity of openness, 
our own imperialistic ego is broken up. As a result, the Other’s fear opens a sense 
responsibility.  We find ourselves entering a new discourse that effaces the stigma of the 
Other’s delusions and suffering.  Bearing forth a language of openness, compassion and 
friendship, the responsible self takes an expiatory stance. 
 
This is no doubt a great shock or an overwhelming surprise for the self to move from a 
state of objectivity to a state of passivity, that is, for the self to become a gift to the 
Other.33   The objective self in its experience of the suffering Other will always seek to 
treat this Other as an object, a presence in consciousness or a fact of knowledge.  But the 
Other is a person whose face we cannot truly know by the lens of objectivity and theory.  
In contrast, the Other’s face is more an enigma exposing one to his/her suffering, wounds 
and outrage.  Furthermore, as an enigma, the Other’s face identifies the trace of God as 
the inspiration that commands us to be responsible.  Even though there will never be 
enough responsibility to answer for the pain and destitution of the suffering Other, the 
enigma of the face inspires a sense of expiation.  We become faced by the Other’s fear of 
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loneliness and death to such an extent that we begin also to bleed with them and take 
responsibility for their wounds with a heart and as a friend.  In this sense, we can begin to 
imagine that alterity is compassion and friendship; a very donation of oneself for the 
other that renews a sense of personhood. 
 
Compassion helps us to understand that the face of the suffering Other speaks of fear and 
death.  Everyday experience will try to hide this reality.  But, when we are exposed to the 
face and its very enigma, we becomes exposed to a persecuted truth, namely that the poor 
one is haemorrhaging – suffering the outrage of persecution and humiliation.  Whether or 
not the wound is real or delusional, any attempt to objectify it with the presence of 
knowledge and experience will perhaps deepen the wound.  If we are to hear the word of 
God in the face of suffering others with compassion, we must develop a sense (of 
transcendence) in which we listen to their fears of loneliness and death and be attentive to 
them in humility even to the point of taking responsibility for their pain and those who 
have grieved them.  This is indeed a great burden.  But what type of responsibility is 
(im)possible?34  Could we not name this friendship in the sense of truly having 
encountered and heard the Father’s Word in the face of the Other (Jn 15:15)? 
 
However, as a starting point for responsibility (as friendship would be the very fruit of a 
relational personhood with the other), I would suggest a compassionate discourse that 
allows grief to unhold.  Experiences of paranoia, delusions, disorganised thoughts and 
behaviours and fear are in some ways responses to overwhelming experiences of existing 
in the world.  The suffering Other is a person in whom the word of God can be testified.  
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But if our testimony is to be heard beyond empathy, then the Other’s pain and suffering 
must also be heard.  No amount of explanations (‘objectified empathy’) may help to 
assuage their suffering.  However, if the suffering ones know that we, perhaps like God, 
are personal and with them in their pain, then there is hope that they truly might feel free 
to voice their fear, pain and outrage.   
 
The fear of death, the very fear in which the self-as-idol tries to conceal, is one which 
needs to have a sacred time and space to be heard.  If the suffering Other trusts and 
believes that we have a heart, then there is a chance – albeit at a risk of falling into 
objectifying them even with empathy – to resuscitate their lives from their world of 
darkness and chaos.  In the Gospels, it is not for nothing that there is silence in regards to 
the experience of Holy Saturday, namely, of Christ going to the lost and God-forsaken 
and of expiating for them.  Likewise, Christ’s salvific action and possession of hell 
teaches us to be faced by the silent fear of death. We are called and moreover 
commanded to witness to such silence with compassion and a heart.  Perhaps then in such 
silence and witness, we might see the beginnings of grief, a crooked path to well-being, 
unfolding ‘with passion’ (compassion) for the Other. 
 
Throughout the article I have specifically set out to suggest a phenomenological and 
theological perspective that may in fact be very relevant to understanding the world of 
psychosis.  My major argument is that everyday experience of the world can be 
overwhelming.  At times, such experience becomes an idol within itself that consumes 
the self, strips it of subjectivity and moreover hides the reality of death.  Hence, the idol 
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or ‘anonymous thing’ exists without the self, leaving only traces of the self.  As the self 
has become depersonalised (capitulated to the catastrophe of no-death), its traces reflect 
horror and fear.  Death seems impossible as the self lives out an impersonal vigilance of 
darkness.  But, if we believe that they are people with faces and in whom the word of 
God is heard, there is hope.   
 
At the very moment where everything seems lost, everything is possible if we can have a 
heart and a sense of otherness for our suffering neighbours.  Their delusions, pain and 
suffering is not useless and for nothing if there is humility and a willingness to bleed and 
grieve with them.  This is no doubt asking too much.  But when we allow for a sacred 
space and time for the fear of death to express itself, we might find ourselves within a 
horizon of transcendence beyond experience and objectivity.  The Other’s face is an 
enigma, but if we make it our desire, we can discover our heart and soul encountering the 
Other’s grief and fear of death.  Then perhaps, like the passivity and powerlessenss of 
Christ in solidarity with the dead during Holy Saturday, we might be able to enter into the 
‘nontime’ of psychosis and respond compassionately to the mystery of death and life: 
Mors et vita duello.35  The mystery of Holy Saturday, especially when enhanced by the 
language of alterity, offers a hope that the gift and love of compassion is possible when 
all seems lost. 
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